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ABSTRACT 
Nearly all psychological research on basic cognitive processes of category formation 
and reasoning uses sample populations associated with large research institutions in 
technologically-advanced societies. Lopsided attention to a select participant pool risks 
biasing interpretation, no matter how large the sample or how statistically reliable the results. 
The experiments in this article address this limitation. Earlier research with urban-USA 
children suggests that biological concepts are (1) thoroughly enmeshed with their notions of 
naive psychology, and (2) strikingly human-centered. Thus, if children are to develop a 
causally appropriate model of biology, in which humans are seen as simply one animal 
among many, they must undergo fundamental conceptual change. Such change supposedly 
occurs between 7 and 10 years of age, when the human-centered view is discarded. The 
experiments reported here with Yukatek Maya speakers challenge the empirical generality 
and theoretical importance of these claims. Part 1 shows that young Maya children do not 
anthropocentrically interpret the biological world. The anthropocentric bias of American 
children appears to owe to a lack of cultural familiarity with non-human biological kinds, not 
to initial causal understanding of folkbiology as such. Part 2 shows that by age of 4-5 (the 
earliest age tested in this regard) Yukatek Maya children employ a concept of innate species 
potential or underlying essence much as urban American children seem to, namely, as an 
inferential framework for understanding the affiliation of an organism to a biological species, 
and for projecting known and unknown biological properties to organisms in the face of 
uncertainty. Together, these experiments indicate that folkpsychology cannot be the initial 
source of folkbiology. They also underscore the possibility of a species-wide and domain-
specific basis for acquiring knowledge about the living world that is constrained and 
modified but not caused or created by prior non-biological thinking and subsequent cultural 
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experience. 
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Introduction 
 The experiments in this article test two competing accounts of how human beings 
acquire basic knowledge of the everyday biological world, including the categorical limits of 
the biological domain and the causal nature of its fundamental constituents.
1
 One influential 
view of conceptual development in folkbiology has been articulated by Susan Carey and her 
collaborators (Carey 1985, 1995; Carey & Spelke 1994, Solomon et al. 1996, Johnson & 
Solomon 1997, Johnson & Carey 1998; see also Au & Romo 1999). On this view, young 
children's understanding of living things is embedded in a folkpsychological, rather than 
folkbiological, explanatory framework. Only by age 7 do children begin to elaborate a 
specifically biological framework of the living world, and only by age 10 does an 
autonomous theory of biological causality emerge that is not based on children‟s 
understanding of how humans think and behave.
 2
 A competing view is that folkbiology and 
folkpsychology emerge early in childhood as largely independent domains of cognition that 
are clearly evident by ages 4 or 5, and which may be innately differentiated (on folkbiology 
see Atran 1987, Keil 1989, Gelman & Wellman 1991, Hatano & Inagaki 1994; on 
folkpsychology see Wimmer & Perner 1983, Leslie 1994, Baron-Cohen 1995, Barrett et al. in 
press).
3
 
 Carey‟s framework combines both similarity-based and causally-based views of 
folkbiology. In support, she presents evidence for a large shift in patterns of projection for 
unfamiliar properties over animal kinds. Carey interprets these results as confirming a 
comparison-to-exemplar model of biological reasoning, wherein humans are the central 
exemplar or prototype (Carey 1985:28). Such non-normative reasoning patterns are 
compelling evidence for a particular conceptual framework (Gopnik & Wellman 1994): 
specifically, an anthropocentric explanatory framework in which children's conceptions of 
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biology are embedded. Children reason about biological phenomena by analogy to humans 
because they construe the world of living things in a way that is fundamentally different from 
how adults construe that world. Radical conceptual reorganization is then needed to acquire 
the purported American adult conceptual system in which humans are "one animal among 
many." The implications for cognitive psychology are compelling: If children‟s thought 
undergoes fundamental conceptual change - a change akin to that seen in scientific 
revolutions - then it is important to understand the mechanisms underlying this change. These 
findings also have direct implications for education, because an effective curriculum must 
take into account the naive, and radically different, theories that young children bring to the 
classroom. 
Despite the importance of this research enterprise for theory and practice, it suffers 
from a serious limitation. The research has been conducted almost exclusively with majority-
culture individuals from North American, urban, technologically-advanced populations. It is 
important to test the generality of the empirical basis for this model. For example, a 
knowledge component could well be driving Carey's pattern of results. Her participants - 
preschoolers from the Boston area - probably have little first-hand experience with the 
natural world. Thus, their human-centered reasoning patterns might reflect lack of knowledge 
about non-human living things rather than a radically different construal of the biological 
world. Thus, it is not clear which aspects of children‟s naïve biology are likely universal and 
which depend critically on cultural conceptions and conditions of learning. We are also left 
with little insight into how to best design science curricula for non-majority, non-urban 
children.  
The competing paradigm of an autonomous folkbiology relies to a greater extent on 
cross-cultural research (Atran 1990; Lopez et al. 1997; see also Berlin et al. 1973; Hunn 
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1977; Hays 1983, Brown 1984, Berlin 1992). There is evidence for universal folkbiological 
principles that are transtheoretical, transcultural, domain-specific, and complex in design. In 
particular, it appears that people in all societies parse local biodiversity into taxonomies 
whose fundamental level is that of the “generic species,” that is, the level of oak and robin.4 
In no other natural domain of human understanding does there appear such a unique and 
fundamental partitioning of reality into mutually exclusive groups that are further organized 
into mutually exclusive groups within groups (Darwin 1883:363).  
For example, in a series of experiments, Coley, Medin and Atran (1997) showed that 
the taxonomic rank of generic-species is cognitively preferred for biological induction in two 
diverse populations: people raised in the Midwestern USA and Itza‟ Maya of the Lowland 
Mesoamerican rainforest. Their findings cannot be explained by domain-general models of 
similarity because such models cannot account for why both cultures prefer species-like 
groups in making inferences about the biological world, although Americans have relatively 
little actual knowledge or experience at this level. In fact, general relations of perceptual 
similarity and expectations derived from experience produce a "basic level" of recognition 
and recall for many Americans that corresponds to the superordinate life-form level of 
folkbiological taxonomy – the level of tree and bird (Rosch et al. 1976). Still Americans 
prefer generic species for making inductions about the distribution of biological properties 
among organisms, and for predicting the nature of the biological world in the face of 
uncertainty. Additional experiments support the idea of the generic-species level as a 
partitioning of the ontological domains of plant and animal into mutually exclusive essences 
that are assumed (but not necessarily known) to have unique underlying causal natures (Atran 
et al. 1997).
5
  
Nevertheless, within this paradigm there has been little direct and controlled study of 
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folkbiological acquisition (Dougherty 1979). The few studies that reach beyond the usual 
sample of children in schools associated with large urban research institutions in the USA 
(e.g., Hatano & Inagaki 1999 on Japan) are nonetheless focused on children from urban, 
technologically-advanced societies. A single study of plant names elicited from Highland 
Maya children during a nature walk tends to confirm an early childhood preference for 
identification of generic species; however, the study provides no information about cognitive 
processes of biological categorization and reasoning or causal structure (Stross 1973). 
The experiments reported here represent an initial attempt to address the dearth in 
cross-cultural studies of folkbiological acquisition. Previous experiments on folkbiological 
acquisition have often ignored adults (Carey‟s studies are an exception). Instead, they rely on 
the implicit familiarity of the experimenter and audience with adults in the standard urban-
USA cultural setting. Without a detailed description of the mature state, however, it is 
difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the learning curve. 
We focus on children and adults of the Yukatek Maya community in southcentral 
Quintana Roo, Mexico. These are rural folk living in small, lowland villages that have a 
somewhat dispersed settlement pattern. The area was only fully pacified by the Mexican 
government at the beginning of the twentieth century, after a rebellion that lasted for more 
than half a century (“The Caste Wars”). For all participants, Yukatek Maya is the mother 
tongue. Except for younger children and older women, most participants also speak 
functional Spanish. Most of the men and older boys are engaged in traditional swidden 
agriculture, although they also work the surrounding forests both for subsistence and sale of 
timber and non-timber products. The expansion of the tourist industry from northeast 
Quintana Roo (e.g., Cancun) into the south has recently begun to siphon off workers from the 
villages. By and large, women and older girls are engaged exclusively with household 
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activities. After the age of six-months, children begin to be initiated into strongly-typed 
gender roles. 
Part I. Induction Studies 
  Carey reports three major findings to bolster the claim that children‟s conceptions of 
the biological world are anthropocentric. First and foremost, projections from humans are 
stronger overall than projections from other living kinds. The other two findings are a natural 
consequence of this difference in induction potential. The second result is that there are 
asymmetries in projection: inferences from human to mammals are stronger than from 
mammals to humans. Third, children violate projections according to similarity: inferences 
from humans to bugs are stronger than from bee to bugs. Together, these findings suggest 
that humans are the preferred base for children‟s inferences about the biological world. 
 In a recent study, Coley, Medin & James (1999) examined biological induction 
among rural Native American children (Menominee Indians). The task projection task was 
patterned after Carey (1985). Children were told that one of the base elements (human, wolf, 
bee, goldenrod, water) has a certain property inside and then asked whether each of the target 
elements share this property with the base. The target elements included human, rock and two 
examples each of mammals (bear, raccoon), birds (eagle, bluejay), reptiles (painted turtle, 
garter snake), fish (sturgeon, rainbow trout) bug (housefly, earthworm), plant (milkweed, 
maple) and artifacts (pencil, bicycle).  
  For young Menominee children humans are a good base and a good target but no 
more so than are other animals. Coley et al. find no evidence that projections from humans 
are reliably higher than projections from other bases. Neither do they find significant 
violations of similarity: inferences from humans to mammals or humans to bugs are no 
stronger than from mammals to other mammals or bees to bugs. Menominee children see 
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humans as one animal among many and not distinct from them (Menominee have an animal-
based clan system). In short, it appears that the induction task is sensitive to general 
knowledge or familiarity with livings kinds as well as specific beliefs about the relation of 
humans to the rest of nature. 
In light of the Menominee results, one possible account of Carey‟s findings for 
Boston-area children is that humans are the closest things to non-human animals that urban 
children know much about and so they generalize from them.
6
  In cultures where children are 
more familiar with non-human species, there may be little, if any, evidence of an 
anthropocentric pattern of biological inference at any age. This is the hypothesis that the 
following experiment was designed to test. 
Method  
Participants 
 Participants were 98 Yukatek Maya-speaking children and 24 Yukatek Maya-
speaking adults from rural villages in southcentral Quintana Roo, Mexico. Forty-six 4-to-5 
year olds and forty-eight 6-to-7 year olds were tested. Equal numbers of males and females 
were included in each group. By and large, the 4-5 year-olds were monolingual, the 6-7 year-
olds had begun learning Spanish, and almost all of the adults understood Spanish as a second 
language. All testing was done in Yukatek Maya. 
Materials 
 Detailed color drawings of objects were used to represent base and target categories. 
Four bases were used: Human, Dog, Peccary and Bee. Targets were divided into two sets. 
Each set included a representative of the categories Human (man, woman), Mammal 
(coatimundi, deer), Bird (eagle, chachalaca), Reptile (boa, turtle), Invertebrate (worm, fly), 
tree (Kanan, Gumbo Limbo), Stuff (stone, mud), Artifact (bicycle, pencil) and Sun (included 
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in both sets). The children were tested on each set at different times, with both sets divided 
equally among girls and boys. Originally a single mammal base was included, but a second 
mammal base was included at a later stage when it became apparent that from other ongoing 
studies that familiarity or domesticity might be a factor. This resulted in some different 
children being used for the different mammal bases. We included Sun as a target because of 
its special role in Maya cosmology and society (formerly dominated by “The Sun Priest” = 
Aj K‟in), and because in an earlier pilot study young children overwhelmingly considered the 
sun to gaze upon people and be “alive.” 
Procedure 
 The procedure was similar to that used in Coley et al. Children were shown a picture 
of one of the bases and taught a new property about it. For example, the experimenter might 
show the dog picture, and say, “Now, there‟s this stuff called andro. Andro is found inside 
some things. One thing that has andro inside is dogs. Now, I‟m going to show you some 
pictures of other things, and I want you to tell me if you think they have andro inside like 
dogs do.” Participants were then shown each of the targets and asked: “Does it have andro 
inside it, like the [base]?” Properties were unfamiliar internal substances of the form “has X 
inside.” A different property was used for each base, and bases and targets were presented in 
random order for each participant. 
Results  
 Each time a child or adult projected a property from a base to a target it was scored 1, 
otherwise 0. Table 1 displays means for targets by base, age group and gender. Responses did 
not differ reliably across any target pair (e.g., coatimundi vs. deer) and data are collapsed 
within target types.  
Adult Inferences. First, consider the adult data overall. Inferences from Human to other living 
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kinds decrease systematically as one moves from mammal to tree. The same systematic 
change as a function of similarity is also evident for the other two mammal bases (dog and 
peccary). With bee as a base, inference is strong to other invertebrates, to trees and to 
humans. Bees often build their nests in trees and humans actively seek out these nests for the 
honey. The pattern of induction from bee suggest that adults use causal/ecological 
information in induction, as has been noted before for both Maya and other kinds of 
biological experts (Lopez et al. 1997, Medin et al. 1997, Atran. 1999; Proffitt, Coley & 
Medin  2000).  
            It is also of interest to compare Human as a base for induction with Dog or Peccary as 
a base. Adults are more likely to project properties from Dog and Peccary to other mammals 
than they are to project from Human to other mammals. The picture with respect to 
asymmetries is somewhat mixed. Inferences going from Human to mammals (0.65) are 
slightly weaker than inferences from Peccary to humans (0.73) but stronger than inferences 
from Dog to humans (0.48). A closer look reveals that this weak inference from Dog to 
humans is largely driven by women (0.25 for women versus 0.71 for men). The justifications 
for dog versus peccary as a base suggests that men consider dogs primarily in terms of forest 
ecology as a hunting companion and as an animal that hunts, whereas women do not. 
 One interesting development shift involves an apparent weakening of the category 
“animal” for adults as a basis for induction. For example, collapsing across age groups, 
induction from Bee to all other animals (mammals, birds, reptiles and insects) is stronger that 
induction from Bee to non-animals (tree, stuff, artifact, sun). An ANOVA reveals this main 
effect: F(1,94) = 40.35, p < .001; however, there is also a AGE GROUP x TARGET 
interaction: F(2,94) = 8.18, p = .001. To tease apart the interaction, we performed t-tests that 
showed the main effect holding for younger children (t(25) = 2.42, p =.02) and older children 
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(t(46) = 7.65, p < .001), but not adults (t(23) = 1.7, n.s.). Adults often cite ecological 
relationships between bees and the trees they inhabit as a basis for induction. 
          Children‟s inferences. Overall, the child and adult induction data are quite similar. 
Referring again to Table 1, note that for Human, Dog and Peccary as bases, inductive 
confidence drops as the target moves from mammals to trees. This pattern holds for both 
groups of children and for all three of these bases. The pattern is weakest for 4-5 year-olds 
with Human as a base; in this case, the trend does not reach statistical reliability. The fact that 
the youngest children show a sharp gradient for Dog and Peccary but not Human suggests 
that the 4-5 year olds do not have a clear conception of where humans fit with the rest of 
things.  
            For the older children, humans are inferior to both Dog and Peccary as a base for an 
induction to mammals. The fact that Dog is a better base for induction than is Peccary 
suggests that familiarity plays a role in inductive confidence.  With respect to asymmetries, 
the youngest children show a human-mammal asymmetry compared with peccaries (0.60 
versus 0.29) but not compared with dogs (0.60 versus 0.59). In the case of the peccary this 
asymmetry is mainly driven by the girls who are very unfamiliar with peccaries. Older 
children show no human to mammals asymmetries.are treated as distinct in that inferences 
from Dog and Peccary to other mammals are stronger than inferences from Dog and Peccary 
to humans. This is also true for the adult data. 
            Older children differ from younger children in showing sharper generalization 
gradients from mammals as bases. The youngest boys show sharper gradients for Peccary 
than do the youngest girls. There are no differences in slope when Dog is the base. 
Interestingly, girls show a much broader generalization gradient for Human as a base than do 
boys. This may owe to girls‟ focus on learning about objects in terms of their household 
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roles. 
            Both ages of children generalize from Bee to other invertebrates, consistent with the 
use of biological similarity to guide inferences. Surprisingly the youngest girls were much 
more likely to generalize from Bee to invertebrates than the youngest boys. We have no 
explanation for this effect. 
 The category “animal” strongly constrains induction form both younger and older 
children; however, the sun somewhat weakens this categorical effect for younger children. 
For example, although t-tests show that projections from Dog and Bee to other animals are 
significantly stronger than from Dog and Bee to non-animals whether or not the sun is 
included as a target, projections to non-animals including the sun are also weaker overall than 
projection to non-animals excluding the sun. Moreover, whereas projection from Peccary to 
other animals is stronger than projection from Peccary to non-animals excluding the sun 
(t(25) = 2.3, p = .03), the difference fails to reach significance if the sun is included among 
the non-animals (t(25) = 1.64, n.s.).  
 Statistical tests support the above general observations. We group the test by 
question. 
1. Human versus animals as an inductive base to near targets. 
         a. DOG: Human to mammal (Figure 1) vs. Dog to mammal (Figure 2) 
  Analysis involved a between subjects ANOVA that included AGE GROUP, 
GENDER, and ITEM (H->m or D->m). The was only a main effect of ITEM 
[F(1,161)=39.75, p=.000] and no effects of AGE GROUP or GENDER. The main effect of 
item is that inferences from Dog to mammal (0.95 across groups) are higher than inferences 
from Human to mammal (0.57 across groups).  This is the case for both genders in all groups. 
These results are inconsistent with Carey‟s predictions because for all ages inferences from 
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Dog to mammal are better than inferences from Human to mammal (compare Figures 1 and 2 
to Figures 4 and 5). 
         b. PECCARY: Human to mammal (Figure 1) vs. Peccary to mammal (Figure 2) 
Difference scores were calculated using (Human to mammal) minus (Peccary to 
mammal). There was only a marginal effect of AGE GROUP [F(2,91)=2.42,p=.095] and no 
effect of GENDER. Mean difference scores were: Younger children,  -0.02 (t-test on H->m 
vs. P->m: t(25)= 0.20, p=.85); Older children, -0.30  (t(46)= 3.5, p=.001); Adult, -0.17  
(t(23)= 2.0, p=.06). Younger girls on the whole have positive difference scores (M = 0.13), 
whereas younger boys have negative difference scores (M = -0.14), although the gap between 
boys and girls does not reach significance. 
 Positive scores are consistent with violations of similarity. As there were no reliably 
positive scores, there was no reliable violation of similarity. Nevertheless, there is a marginal 
developmental shift in which the youngest children are as willing to project from Human to 
mammals as they are from Peccary to mammals, whereas the older children and adults are 
more willing to project from Peccary to mammals than from Human to mammals. This shift 
may, again, have its source in the relative unfamiliarity of the youngest girls with peccaries. 
        c. BEE: Human to invertebrate (Figure 1) vs. Bee to invertebrate (Figure 3)  
Difference scores were calculated using (Bee to invertebrate) minus (Human to 
invertebrate). With GENDER and AGE GROUP included as factors, again only AGE 
GROUP was significant [F(2, 91)=3.36, p=.039]. Mean difference scores were: Younger 
children, 0.10 (t-test on B->i vs. H->i: t(25)= .78, p=.45); Older children, 0.32  (t(46)= 3.94, 
p=.000); Adults, 0.50  (t(23)= 6.28, p=.0001). Posthoc tests show that older children do differ 
from younger children or adults, but younger children differ from adults.  
 In this case, negative scores are consistent with Carey. As there are no reliably 
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negative scores, there was no reliable violation of similarity (compare Figures 1 and 3 to 
Figures 4 and 6). Nevertheless, there is again a marginal a developmental shift in which the 
youngest children are almost as willing to project from Human to invertebrates as they are 
from Bee to invertebrates, while the older children and adults are more willing to project 
from Bee to invertebrates than from Human to invertebrates. Bear in mind, though, that the 
youngest children generalize very broadly and indiscriminately from humans, a finding 
consistent with the idea that the children do not have a clear conception of how humans fit 
into the overall folk-taxonomic system. 
2. Human versus other animals as an inductive base overall. 
 To examine whether Human was a preferred inductive base overall we analyzed 
projections in two different ways. First, we counted the number of targets that each 
participant projected a base property onto. A BASE (4) by GENDER (2) by AGE GROUP 
(3) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of BASE: F(3,43) = 16.2, p < .001. Projection from 
Human is least common across age groups, and inferences from Dog most common. Post hoc 
Tukey HSD tests indicate that inference from Human (M  = 4.76), from Peccary (M = 5.32) 
and from Bee (M =6.09) is each significantly less than inference from Dog (M = 7.01); also 
inference from Human is reliably less than inference from Bee. Second, we analyzed the 
target means as function of BASE (4), GENDER (2) and AGE GROUP (3). The ANOVA 
showed main effects for AGE GROUP, F(2,192) =3.813, p = < .05, and GENDER, F(1,192) 
= 6.095, p < .05. Post hoc tests indicate that younger children project properties more readily 
than adults (older children are not different form younger children or adults). Neither analysis 
shows inferences from Human to be stronger than those from any other base overall. 
         Another perspective on reasoning patterns is provided by analyses of how differentiated 
patterns of generalization are for different bases. We conducted trend analyses to look at 
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projection as a function of similarity, with birds were at distance 1 from mammals, reptiles at 
distance 2, insects at distance 3 and trees at distance 4. The factors in the trend analysis were 
AGE GROUP and SIMILARITY (distance) and our interest was in the linear component. 
         With Human as a base, there was a main effect of similarity [F(1,94) = 11.68 , p < 
0.001] and a reliable interaction of age with similarity [F(2,94), p < 0.01].  The interaction 
arises from the fact that adults show a sharper generalization gradient than either group of 
children. With Dog as a base there is also a main effect of similarity [F(1,73) = 241.2, p < 
0.001] and a group by similarity interaction [F(2,73) = 4.85 , p <0.05]. The sharpness of the 
gradient increases with age but all three groups show reliable similarity effects. For Peccary 
as a base there is a reliable effect of similarity [F(1,94) = 39.9, p < .001] but no significant 
interaction of group with similarity. Finally with Bee as a base there is an effect of similarity 
[F(1,71) = 20.14, p < 0.001] but again no reliable interaction. 
         To summarize the trend analyses, all age groups show clear similarity effects with Dog, 
Peccary and Bee as bases. The generalization (similarity) gradients become sharper with age 
for Dog as a base. With Human as a base, 4-5 year olds generalize broadly in an 
undifferentiated manner - they show no reliable effect of similarity. In contrast, adults show 
characteristically sharp gradients with Human as a base. The 6-7 year olds show a very weak 
similarity gradient. In short, the clearest developmental change is in determining the role of 
humans in the folktaxonomic system. 
3. Asymmetries in projections to and from humans. 
 Asymmetry in inference patterns from humans to non-humans versus non-humans to 
humans is another indication of anthropocentric reasoning. To test this, we analyzed 
projection from four bases: Human, Dog, Peccary and Bee. Analyses involved ANOVAs and 
t-tests on difference scores. The dependent variable for each subject was their base to target 
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(e.g., Human to mammal) score minus their target to base (e.g., Mammal to human) score. 
a. Human-Dog asymmetries. These analyses were between subjects analyses which 
included AGE GROUP, GENDER, and ITEM (H -> m or D -> h). This analysis resulted in a 
AGE GROUP by GENDER interaction [F(2,161)=5.38, p=.005] and an ITEM by AGE 
GROUP by GENDER interaction [F(2,161)=5.38, p=.005]. To interpret the interaction with 
gender we repeated this ANOVA separately for males and females.   
For males there was no effect of ITEM indicating that there is no asymmetry.  There 
was only an effect of AGE GROUP [F(2,79)=3.56, p=.033]. The means from Table 1 are: 
young children = 0.55, older children = 0.42, adults = 0.71. Tukey HSD posthoc tests showed 
a marginal difference between old children and adults (p=.07).  This means simply that adults 
overall tended to say “yes” more often than the older children, regardless of item. For 
females, there was only an ITEM by AGE GROUP interaction [F(2,82)= 4.43, p=.015] the 
means for which are in Table 1. For the youngest girls there is no asymmetry, t(24)= .097, 
p=.654. For older girls, Dog to human inferences (M = 0.83) are preferred over Human to 
mammal inferences  (M= 0.46), t(36)= 2.24, p=.031. For adults, Human to mammal 
inferences (M = 0.58) are preferred over Dog to human inferences (M= 0.25), t(22)= 2.35, 
p=.028.   
Summary: For males there are no asymmetries: Dog to human inferences and Human 
to mammal inferences are equally good. For older girls there is a shift with age, but in the 
direction opposite to that predicted by anthropocentrism. The asymmetry shown by older 
girls may result from the greater familiarity they have with dogs than with wild mammals 
(coatimundi, deer) used as the targets in the task (and in the Human to mammal inferences).  
Because they are familiar with dogs they may be comfortable reasoning about them, whereas 
their lack of familiarity with the targets makes them less likely to infer things of them.  For 
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adult women, this familiarity effect may not play a role. These data are inconsistent with 
Carey because only adult women show the asymmetry favoring Human to mammal over Dog 
to human (compare Figures 1 and 2 to Figures 4 and 5). 
b. Human-Peccary asymmetries. This analysis was done the same way as the previous 
analysis, with difference scores calculated as: (Human to mammal) minus (Peccary to 
human). There was an effect of AGE GROUP [F(2,91)=3.25,p=.043] and a GENDER x AGE 
GROUP interaction [F(2,91)=4.92, p=.009]. Mean difference scores for were: Younger 
children, 0.29 (t-test on H->m vs. P->h: t(25)= 2.44, p=.022); Older children, 0.04  (t(46)= 
.47, p=.642); Adult, -0.08  (t(23)= 1.0, p=.328).  
Positive scores for younger children are consistent with Carey‟s predictions (compare 
Figure 2 and Figure 5); however, the GENDER x AGE GROUP interaction indicates that the 
effect of AGE GROUP is only shown by younger girls, not younger boys. For younger girls, 
AGE GROUP F(2,50)=5.83, p=.005; for younger boys, AGE GROUP F(2,47)=.847, p=.44. 
Summary: The youngest girls show an asymmetry in which they prefer to induce from 
Human to mammals rather than vice versa. None of the other participants show this 
asymmetry. Again this may be a familiarity effect: the peccary is a wild animals that young 
girls who stay by the household are not very familiar with. Young boys who venture into the 
forest with their fathers are more likely to have seen peccaries on different occasions. 
c. Human-Bee asymmetries. The dependent variable for each subject in the ANOVA 
was their (Human to invertebrate) score minus their (Bee to human) score. The analysis 
included gender and group as between-subjects factors.  There was an effect of AGE GROUP 
[F(2,91)=10.97, p<.001], but no effect of GENDER. Mean difference score were: Younger 
children, 0.23 (t-test on H-> i vs. B-> h: t(25)=2.29, p=.031); Older children, 0.06  
(t(46)=.68, p=.50); Adults, -0.48  (t(23)= 5.47, p=.0001).  
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Positive scores indicate that Human to invertebrate is better than Invertebrate to 
human, which is consistent with Carey‟s predictions. Posthoc analyses show that adults differ 
from children, but the children groups do not differ from each other even though the older 
children show no appreciable asymmetry. Paired samples (within subjects) t-tests show only 
a difference between Human to invertebrate versus Bee to human inferences for young 
children.  
 Summary: There is a developmental shift wherein youngest children show an 
asymmetry in which they find human-invertebrate inferences (Figure 1) stronger than 
invertebrate-human inferences (Figure 3). By age 6 this asymmetry has disappeared. By 
adulthood the asymmetry is reversed so that properties are more readily projected from 
invertebrates to humans than vice versa. Young children also show a slight asymmetry in 
favor of projections from Mammals (Dog and Peccary) to invertebrates versus Bee to 
mammals (Table 1). Although the difference does not reach significance, it may suggest a 
familiarity effect: human-invertebrate interactions are just more familiar than mammal-
invertebrate interactions, and humans and mammals are more familiar than invertebrates as 
sources of knowledge and inference. 
Discussion 
 Findings from studies of inductive projection among Yukatek Maya (Figures 1,2,3) 
do not replicate Carey‟s results with urban American children (Figures 4, 5, 6) and are not 
consistent with the claim that folkbiology is decidedly anthropocentric until late childhood. 
First, for Yukatek Maya children, projections from humans are no stronger than projections 
from other living kinds. Second, there is no overall asymmetry for Yukatek children as 
compared to Carey‟s urban American children. Third, the children do not clearly violate their 
own perceptions of similarity out of preference for humans as an inductive base.  
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 There are, however, some asymmetry effects for the youngest girls with respect to a 
wild versus domestic animal base (Human -> mammal > Peccary -> human) and for the 
youngest children overall with respect to inferences involving invertebrates (compare Figures 
1 and 4 with Figures 5 and 6). The fact that such asymmetries are not generalized across the 
youngest age group suggests that they are the result of familiarity effects rather 
anthropocentric bias as such. Younger girls are less familiar with wild animals than younger 
boys, and younger children on the whole are less familiar with invertebrates than they are 
with humans or mammals. Less familiarity with wild animals and invertebrates may favor 
them less as sources of induction. The fact that dogs are a better base for induction than are 
peccaries is consistent with this observation. 
         In important respects the data imply that humans are not a good inductive base for the 
children. First, the fact that young children (especially the girls) generalize in a fairly 
undifferentiated way from humans suggests that they may not have a clear grasp of how 
humans fit into the tree of life. (The young girls show the same pattern with the peccary, an 
animal with which they are unfamiliar.) Second, older children and adults generalize more 
from nonhuman mammals to other mammals than they do from humans to mammals. This 
indicates that humans are, in some respects, special. This is surprising given Carey‟s findings 
but consistent with the observation of Johnson, Mervis and Boster (1992) that many children 
do not think of humans as animals.  
 A third distinctive pattern that involves humans concerns their special relation to the 
sun. Younger and older children generalize more from humans to the sun than from any other 
base to the sun. Adults do not show this pattern. At this stage, it is difficult to distinguish 
cultural from other developmental factors in interpreting children‟s projections to the sun. 
The fact that adult Yukatek accord no inductive preference to sun indicates that the 
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developmental pattern is not a simple function of cultural influence. Rather, the sun‟s culture 
role in Maya lore may differentially impinge upon the developmental process. A cultural 
theme like the Maya sun may influence children in ways not seen in the adults of that culture, 
much as the themes of Santa Clause or God can in our culture (Evans in press, Barrett et al. 
in press). Until we have comparative data regarding the sun from other cultural populations, 
however, further speculation would be premature. We will be running additional experiments 
to fill this void. 
 On the whole, Yukatek Maya children look much like Menominee children but with 
some intriguing gender differentiation. These gender differences may reflect the strong 
sexual division of activity that is institutionalized early in the first year of life: in the jetz‟ 
ceremony, Maya girls are introduced by the women to household utensils, whereas Maya 
boys are introduced by the men to agricultural and hunting tools. Later in life, Maya women 
will spend their time almost wholly in the vicinity of the house and house garden, in close 
interaction with domestic animals. By contrast, Maya men spend days, weeks and even 
months in the forest away from home, and consider animals primarily in terms of their forest 
habits. For Maya females, dogs are household animals, whereas men value dogs as hunting 
animals. Maya boys also venture out into the forest with their fathers at an early age, and so 
become familiar with wild animals, such as the peccary, before girls do.  
These latter findings suggest that induction patterns may be influenced by relative 
familiarity with animals and by the culturally specific character of the functional and 
ecological relationships between humans and other natural categories of elements. There 
seems to be additional support for this in the fact that Maya adults more readily project from 
peccary and bee to humans, and from bee to tree, than do the children. Maya adults consider 
peccaries and bees to be prime sources of food, and food to be vital to human health and 
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physical make-up. Bees primarily make their homes in trees and Maya adults can often tell 
from a tree‟s aspect whether bees are likely to be housed in it (and even what honey found 
inside is likely to taste like). Consistent with this view, Inagaki (1990) presents evidence that 
knowledge does influence children's biological reasoning. She found that kindergarteners 
who raised goldfish were more likely than their counterparts who did not raise goldfish to 
reason about a novel aquatic animal (a frog) by analogy to goldfish rather than by analogy to 
humans. Thus, knowledge may enable goldfish-raisers to use goldfish as an analogical base 
in a way that non-goldfish raisers could not. 
 In sum, even 4-5 Yukatek Maya children show no clear commitment to an 
anthropocentric understanding of the natural world. Indeed our evidence is more consistent 
with the view that young children are uncertain about how humans fit into the web of life 
even while they have a good understanding of how the major life forms are related. The main 
conceptual change Yukatek children must undergo is not forming an autonomous biology but 
rather understanding the role of humans on the biology of plants and animals. This shows that 
folkpsychology is not universally the source for folkbiology. The fact that urban American 
children do show an anthropocentric bias likely owes more to a difference in cultural 
exposure to non-human biological kinds than to basic causal understanding of folkbiology 
per se.  
Part II. Inheritance Task 
Young individuals have the potential to develop certain adult characteristics before 
those characteristics appear.  The origins of these characteristics can be explained in two 
broadly different ways: nature and nurture.  Some characteristics seem likely to develop from 
birth because they are essential to the species to which the individual belongs, such as a 
squirrel‟s ability to jump from tree to tree and hide acorns.  Other characteristics are 
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determined by the environment in which the individual is reared, such as a squirrel‟s fear or 
lack of fear of human beings.  In this study we examine how children project category-typical 
as well as unknown behaviors and physical features of animals.  We explore whether 
projections are made on the basis of presumptions of underlying species essence or 
environmental context, and we examine how presumptions of underlying species essence 
might sustain the hypothesis that young children have a folkbiology. 
Gelman and Wellman (1991) argue that young children predict category-typical 
characteristics of individual animals based on the innate potential of the animal (i.e. the 
species of its birth parent) rather than the environment in which it was raised (i.e. the species 
of its adoptive parent).  Using an adoption study, they showed that four-year-old children 
judge that a baby cow raised by pigs will have the category-typical characteristics of cows 
(moos, straight tail) rather than pigs (oinks, curly tail).  They interpret the results as showing 
that preschoolers believe that the innate potential or essence of species determines how an 
individual will develop, even in contrary environments.   
This study is inconclusive with regard to children‟s assumptions about innate 
potential for two reasons. First, before the children in the study predicted the adult properties 
of the adopted baby, they were shown a drawing of the baby animal and told its species 
identity. The children may have projected properties based not on the species of the birth 
parent, but rather on the basis of the species of the baby itself.  Because the experimenters 
told the child that the baby and mother were of the same species, the study does not address 
the question of how the children identify to which species the baby belongs in the first place. 
To demonstrate that the children attribute property origins to inheritance from the birth 
species requires that the children make the same inferences in the absence of any explicit 
prior identification of the baby‟s birth species (see Solomon et al. 1996). Given this explicit 
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verbal identification, one cannot rule out that the children‟s performance owes to an 
essentialist bias that is a general property of language. Because the animal was labeled as 
being a member of a particular species, children might expect that this identity is maintained 
over time, and that the animal would continue to have the properties of the labeled species, 
without reasoning about the mechanism involved (Gelman & Hirschfeld 1999).
7
 
Second, the study explored only known facts about species and their associated 
properties. It did not examine whether or not children use the concept of species essence or 
biological parentage as an inferential framework for interpreting and explaining known and 
as yet unknown facts. It may be that a child has learned from experience, and as a matter of 
fact,  that a calf is a cow because it was born to a cow. Still, the child may not know that 
being a member of a certain species causes a cow to be a cow (Carey 1995, Johnson & Carey 
1998). Similarly, a child may learn to correlate other children‟s toy preferences and gender, 
and to predict toy preferences on the basis of gender, without necessarily inferring that 
gender has a causal or explanatory role in toy preferences. In other words, children‟s 
performance could be simply explained by their knowledge of input-output relations that are 
managed by a domain-general learning mechanism. 
Johnson and Solomon (1997) designed a set of tasks in part to address the 
methodological issues associated with Gelman and Wellman‟s (1991) adoption study. First, 4 
to 7-year-old children were told a cross-adoption story accompanied by pictures of each 
parent. The pictures were sketches that clearly identified the species of each parent, but with 
minimum detail. Importantly, the experimenter provided no picture of the baby, and did not 
explicitly identify the baby‟s species. Second, properties were chosen to minimize factual or 
pre-learned associations with one or the other species. For example, the child was asked of a 
baby born to a horse but raised by a cow if it would have a brown nose like the cow or a 
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black nose like the horse. Properties included physical traits (e.g., black nose / brown nose), 
beliefs (did / did not know where special food was kept) and behaviors (e.g., liked to be alone 
/ in crowds). Inclusion of beliefs in addition to physical traits owes its justification to Carey‟s 
(1985) studies. Carey‟s studies suggest that children before the age of ten do not distinguish 
between the biological and psychological domains in terms of classes of properties (physical 
traits versus beliefs) that have distinct causal origins. If children do not distinguish between 
biological and psychological domains, they should not show different patterns of projection 
of physical and mental properties.  
Johnson & Solomon were interested in whether children would differentiate physical 
from belief properties by projecting the former from the birth parent and the latter from the 
adoptive parent.  They argue that only the above pattern of property differentiation provides 
sufficient evidence that children have an inheritance theory of the origin of properties.
8
 The 
majority of children at all ages failed to show this pattern of property differentiation.  The 
data indicate, however, that across all ages children were more than three times as likely to 
produce birth bias patterns than adoptive bias patterns (bias patterns are those in which 
children chose at least 10 of 12 physical, mental, and behavioral properties of the birth or 
adoptive parent). 
 In contrast to children, USA adults did show a differentiated pattern – they clearly 
associated physical properties with the birth parent and mental properties with the adoptive 
parent. Moreover, for adults behaviors almost always patterned with beliefs.  The authors 
conclude that the children are not able to distinguish classes of animal properties with respect 
to their domain-specific causal origins. This conclusion is in line with Solomon et al.‟s  
(1996) findings that children do not distinguish the causal origins of physical versus mental 
properties of people. The results are taken as further support of Carey‟s (1985, 1995) claim 
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that there is no early principled (theoretical) distinction between the biological and 
psychological domains. The authors grant that there may be an essentialist bias to project 
properties from the birth parent in cases where there are pre-learned associations of kinds 
with properties, and where children have some factual information about where babies come 
from (e.g., inside mommies‟ tummies). Nevertheless, they imply that this essentialist bias 
does not provide a theoretical basis for inferring causal relationships that involve novel 
properties. Neither does it have a domain-specific causal origin “because it applies equally 
well to nonbiological properties such as beliefs” (Johnson & Solomon 1997:415). 
We want to question this line of reasoning. Johnson & Solomon argue that evidence 
for an inheritance theory of property origins rests on whether children differentially attribute 
physical properties and belief properties.  However, there are problems with this assumption. 
 First, they assume that children think of animals as having beliefs in the same way that they 
think of people as having beliefs.  This assumption presupposes the identity of the 
folkbiological and folkpsychological domains; thus the results should not be taken as 
evidence for that identity. Second, even if children naturally and spontaneously interpret 
animal behavior in terms of belief-desire psychology, there is no a priori reason to suppose 
that beliefs should project from the adoptive parent rather than the birth parent.  As Gellman 
and Wellman (1191:216) note: “essential similarities may also be in the form of behaviors, 
functions, parentage, psychological make-up, or even intangible qualities (e.g., soul).”  Third, 
what is essential and projectible from the birth parent may depend in part on the context and 
character of the beliefs and behaviors being probed.  In the Johnson and Solomon study, 
behaviors (e.g., did / did not know where special food was kept) and beliefs (e.g., liked to be 
alone / in crowds) were context-sensitive and sometimes hardly distinguishable (e.g., know 
versus like both imply propositional attitudes).  In the Gelman and Wellman study behaviors 
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were context-free (e.g., moos / oinks).  Gelman and Wellman actually found behaviors to be 
more reliable predictors of species kind than physical features. 
We argue that sufficient evidence that a specifically biological framework underlies 
causal assumptions about property origins does not require attribution of beliefs to adoptive 
parents.  Instead, we hold that a biological interpretation of property origins requires that 
children assume that certain kinds of properties are attributed to birth parents rather than 
adoptive parents despite the lack of prior association between the property and the category. 
Our cross-cultural study was designed to test the extent to which children‟s assumptions 
about innate species potential govern projection of both known and unknown properties. The 
current study was designed to avoid the problems noted for these earlier studies in testing the 
hypothesis that young children have an essentialist understanding of biological phenomena 
and, therefore, that they already have a causally conceptualized folkbiology. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 48 Yukatek Maya-speaking children and 24 Yukatek Maya-
speaking adults (M=33 years; range = 26 to 40). Twenty-four 4-to-5 year olds (M=5;3, range 
= 4;6 to 5;11) and twenty-four 6-to-7 year olds (M=7;1, range = 6;7 to 7;7) were tested and 
included.  An equal number of males and females was included in each group. By and large, 
the 4-5 year-olds were monolingual, the 6-7 year-olds had begun learning Spanish, and 
alnmost all of the adults understood Spanish as a second language. All testing was done in 
Yukatek Maya. 
Procedure 
 In a forced choice task, children were asked whether an adult animal adopted at birth 
would resemble its adoptive parent (e.g., cow) or birth parent (e.g., pig) on four different 
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individual traits (see Appendix A for the text of the story): known behaviors (e.g. moo / 
oink), known physical features (e.g. straight / curly tail), unknown, arbitrary behaviors (e.g. 
looks for cardinals / looks for sparrows), and unknown physical features (e.g. heart gets 
flatter / rounder when it is sleeping). Known traits were context-free, category-typical 
features that the children readily associated with species, whereas unknown traits were 
chosen to minimize any possibility of factual or pre-learned associations of traits with 
categories. Each unknown trait within a set was attributed to the birth parent for half the 
participants and to the adoptive parent for the other half.  This assured that projection 
patterns of the unknown traits were not based on prior associations. 
 The stories were accompanied by sketches of each parent (see Figure 7). As in the 
Johnson and Solomon study, sketches were designed to unambiguously represent a particular 
species of animal with minimum detail.  In addition, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, sketches of 
known physical features (e.g. a sketch of a curly or straight tail), unknown physical features 
(e.g. flat vs. round heart) and relevant aspects of unknown behavioral contexts (e.g., closed 
vs. open eyes, mahogany vs. cedar tree) were also shown to the participant.  These sketches 
in no way indicated the species to which the traits belonged.  Sketches of traits were placed 
beside the sketches of the species they were being attributed to.  Participants indicated their 
choice of birth or adoptive parent species by pointing to the relevant parent sketch. 
 The story was followed by two comprehension controls: a birth control (Who gave 
birth to the baby?  Go ahead and point out the drawing of who gave birth to the baby.) and a 
nurture control (Who did the baby grow up with?)  If the child failed either control the 
adoption story was repeated and a second failure in comprehension resulted in exclusion of 
the child from the experiment. Children then were presented with the four experimental 
probes (see Appendix B).  For example: The cow mooed and the pig oinked.  When the baby 
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is all grown up will it moo like a cow or oink like a pig?  For each set, the four probes were 
followed by a bias control in which the participant was asked: When the baby was growing 
up did it eat with animals that looked like X or animals that looked like Y?  Go ahead and 
point out the animal that looks like the animals the baby grew up eating with.  Notice that the 
bias control is not simply a memory check, but requires the child to generate an inference 
about the relationship between nurturing, in general, and eating, in particular. 
The same procedure was used with all three sets. The order of the four trait probes 
was randomized across participants, as was the order of presentation of the three sets. The 
order of presentation of parents within each probe was held constant for each child and 
counterbalanced across children.  
Following presentation of the three sets on the four trait probes and the bias control 
children were asked: “Now the baby is all grown up, what kind of animal is it? Go ahead and 
point out the kind of animal the baby grew up to be.” The additional probe for kindhood was 
designed to test Johnson and Solomon finding that 4-year-olds reliably attributed kindhood to 
the birth parent. In Yukatek Maya there is no direct gloss for “kind.” Instead, the Mayanized 
Spanish word klaasej was used.  
A final probe involved a transformation story to explore the extent to which species 
essences are associated with inheritance versus vital internal properties as such (i.e., blood, 
see Appendix A). Keil (1989:224), found that the younger children are undecided as to 
whether inheritance or internal properties are primarily responsible for an animal‟s species 
identity. 
Results  
 For each probe, participants were given a score of one if they chose the birth parent 
and zero if they chose the adoptive parent. A 2 (gender) x 3 (age group) x 3 (set) x 6 (probe 
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type: known behavior, known physical feature, unknown behavior, unknown physical 
feature, blood, and kind) repeated measures ANOVA indicated only a main effect of probe 
type, F(5, 62)=3.9, p<.01.  Probe type means are shown in Table 2. Each mean was tested 
against chance (0.5) and the results are indicated in Table 2.   
Overall, the results show a systematic and robust preference for attributions from the 
birth parent. This preference was observed for all age groups and for known and unknown 
behavior and physical properties. The trend is somewhat stronger in older children and adults 
and slightly stronger for known than unknown properties. Means for all probes were 
significantly different from chance, except the kind and blood for the youngest children. The 
kind probe was only marginally different from chance for the young children (p=0.10), 
possibly because of foreign character of the Mayanized Spanish word for kind, klaasej. 
Results on the blood probe for the youngest children might suggest genuine indecision as to 
whether inheritance or vital internal functioning is primarily responsible for an animal‟s 
species identity. The low mean on the bias control probe for all groups indicates that the 
method of the current experiment did not bias participant responses toward the birth parent. 
To measure the effect of the different trait probes, a 3 (AGE GROUP) x 2 (GENDER) 
x 3 (SET) x 2 (known vs. unknown trait) x 2 (behavioral vs. physical trait) repeated measures 
ANOVA showed only a main effect of the familiarity of the probe (known = 0.88 and 
unknown = 0.81) [F(1,66)=9.5, p=0.003].  Across groups, children and adults are more likely 
to attribute known than unknown properties to the birth parent. 
In order to measure whether there was a difference in the strength of the birth parent 
bias across groups, percent birth parent attributions was calculated for each participant across 
trait types (all probes except the bias control probe). A one-way ANOVA with AGE GROUP 
as the independent factor and BIRTH BIAS as the dependent variable showed an effect of 
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group [F(2,71)=23.3, p<.001]. Tukey post hoc tests showed that the strength of the BIRTH 
BIAS was stronger for older children (0.89) and adults (0.94), who did not differ from one 
another, than for younger children (0.67).   
 In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that Yukatek Maya children and adults 
assume that members of a species share an innate causal potential that largely determines 
category-typical behavioral and physical properties even in conflicting environments. The 
current study is a first demonstration that members of another culture systematically use this 
notion of species essence to project unknown properties in the face of uncertainty. Projection 
of properties to the birth parent in the face of uncertainty and novelty implies that even young 
Maya children use the notion of underlying essence as an inferential framework for 
understanding the nature of biological species.
9
  By the age of seven, children have 
effectively attained adult competence in inferential use of the notion of innate species 
potential. 
Discussion 
One of the more difficult issues in theoretical disputes is separating conflicts over 
matters of fact from conflicts over meaning. The dispute here is over the criterion of 
demarcation for what can be considered a folkbiology. For Carey, demarcation involves the 
notion of intuitive framework theory. The attribution of an intuitive framework theory to 
young child “requires establishing that the child distinguishes entities in the domain of the 
theory from those not in its domain, and appeals to theory-specific causal mechanisms to 
explain the interactions among the entities in the domain” (Carey 1995). On this view, 
attributing a folkbiology to young children entails attributing a biological causal mechanism 
that delimits an ontological domain.  
So far, we agree. But Carey‟s account also implicitly involves two a priori claims 
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with which we do not agree: namely, that (1) causal understanding does not exist in the 
absence of any detailed knowledge of specific causal laws or mechanisms, and (2) 
essentialism is too causally vague and domain-general to distinguish biology. Concerning the 
first claim, the minimum conditions that Carey sets for a properly biological notion of 
causality tend to overplay the causal mechanisms that adults use to understand biological 
phenomena: “pre-school children have learned that „germs' are a cause of disease, but we do 
not know whether this knowledge goes beyond naming „germs' as the cause of disease…. 
Such knowledge may simply be a learned input-output relation, such as that eating good 
foods keeps you healthy and makes you grow, and may not constitute knowledge of any 
mechanism” (Carey 1995:284; cf. Kalish 1993). Thus, „germ‟ cannot count as part of a causal 
mechanism because there is no understanding of the specific processes involved. Ordinary 
adults, however, may have a barely more elaborate causal understanding of germs or 
genetics.
10
 The problem here is not simply that of overestimating adult knowledge, but of 
implicitly subordinating the notion of causal mechanism to a preconceived standard of 
explicit detail.  
 Concerning the second claim, Carey holds that essentialism is not a serious candidate 
for causally organizing the biological domain because it is simply a general property of 
language: “Essentialism, like taxonomic structure, derives from the logical work done by 
nouns. The child has a default assumption that… every count noun carries with it the idea 
that the identity of the entity picked out by the noun is unchanged in the face of surface 
changes” (Carey 1995:277). By 18 months of age, for example, children are able to 
consistently apply nouns to persons, animals and substances identified over time (Macnamara 
1982, 1986). Nevertheless, this is a different sense of essentialism than the concept of innate 
causal and inductive potential that we (and others) intend. 
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Our use of essentialism to describe the causal underpinnings of folkbiology conforms 
to the idea of “psychological essentialism” formulated by Medin and Ortony (1989). 
Psychological essentialism is a framework theory that defines the ontology of a domain and 
places limits on the kinds of information and causal mechanisms that specific theories can 
incorporate. The central claim of psychological essentialism is that surface features may be 
seen as effects caused by deeper, underlying features even in the absence of knowledge about 
specific causal mechanisms. Biological essentialism is a particular version of psychological 
essentialism: “The essential trait, or nature, (e.g., the peculiar felinity of tigers) „underlies‟ 
the better known perceptible features (e.g., being large and striped); that is, the perceptual 
features of a kind are presumed to be natural consequences of, or to be naturally caused by, 
the essential nature of that kind, even if the essential nature is largely unknown and perhaps 
effectively unknowable” (Atran 1987:44). In this version of essentialism, there might not 
even be a set of defining features at the surface level because essences might not always 
generate necessary and sufficient properties. Something could be part of an essence but not 
necessarily manifest the associated surface properties. For example, tigers could be 
essentially described as large, striped quadrupeds that roar, but circumstances might conspire 
such that a given tiger develops as a mute, as three-legged, as an albino, or as a dwarf. A tiger 
may still be theoretically and virtually quadrupedal (i.e., in virtue of its underlying nature) 
even if only three-legged in actual appearance. 
By contrast, Carey‟s (1995) notion of linguistic essentialism does not require a “deep-
cause” structure. On her definition of essentialism, all that is required is some sort of 
maintenance of identity over time. This notion of essentialism does not distinguish between 
presumptively complex causal concepts, such as “oak” or “robin”, and presumptively simple 
causal concepts, such as “seat” or “hill” that depend only on surface features that are 
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practically identical with underlying “essence”: a seat is a seat because it can be sat upon, no 
matter whoever or whatever made it, and no matter whatever it is made of; a hill is a hill 
because it is higher than the surrounding landscape but lower than a mountain, whatever 
different and independent causes might be responsible for such a state of affairs.
11
 Because 
this relatively unconstrained definition of essentialism extends to nonbiological concepts, it 
follows that this notion of essentialism cannot be the demarcating criterion for folkbiology. 
This is a matter of semantics, not fact.
12
 
Our hypothesis is that from a quite early age children have intuitions that the 
mechanisms underlying essential causes are biological. The essential causal relations are 
those involving, for example, birth, biological relatedness and internal structure. It is unlikely 
that young children have a worked out a specific theory or detailed model that integrates 
inheritance, growth, physiological functioning, disease, death and so forth ; however, it may 
be plausible to credit them with a generally biological framework. The details likely change 
with development and vary cross-culturally.  Thus, it may well be that people in all cultures 
assign every individual nonhuman living kind to one and only one folk species (also called 
“generic” or “generic species”) on the basis of a universal causal presumption that local 
biodiversity is divided into essential kinds (Atran 1998). But people in different cultures may 
attribute very different contents and causes to species essences. For example, Itza‟ Maya 
Indians, whose everyday lives depend upon knowledge of biological kinds, appear to have 
much richer knowledge and causal inferences associated with folk species than do urban or 
rural Americans (Lopez, et al. 1997, Coley et al. 1997, Atran et al. 1997). Nevertheless, Itza‟ 
Maya and Americans readily agree on the common folk species present in their respective 
environments, and also agree that biological information and inference is best had at the folk-
species level (e.g., at the level of dog and sparrow as opposed to subordinate level of 
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doberman and song sparrow or the superordinate level of mammal and tree). Similarly, 
Japanese and American children acknowledge many of the same species, although Japanese 
children appear to have much more elaborated vitalist theories of what causes, for instance, a 
given dog to be a dog (Hatano & Inagaki 1999).  
Conclusion 
It is a troubling fact that nearly all psychological research on basic cognitive 
processes of category formation and reasoning is based on work with populations associated 
with large research institutions in technologically-advanced societies. It would be hard to 
come up with a more culturally-restricted subject pool from which to generalize to humanity 
as a whole. Lopsided attention to a select participant pool risks biasing interpretation, no 
matter how large the sample population or how statistically reliable the results.  
With regard to biological understanding, the effect of this bias may be aggravated by 
people‟s relative lack of direct contact with nature‟s species. Much of what folk in our 
societies know about animals, for example, comes from books and television programs that 
focus on domestic animals and non-native mammals. This is a poor and fragmentary sample 
compared to the natural conditions under which humanity‟s cognitive capacities evolved and 
most human cultures developed and diversified. The pitfalls of generalizing about biological 
knowledge from this one cultural sample – however large or convenient- might be 
comparable to the perils of generalizing about human language just from studies of feral 
children.  
Nevertheless, such generalization is routine and rarely questioned in the major 
journals that serve as research outlets. Doing otherwise would present serious 
inconveniences. Instead of handing out questionnaires to undergraduate psychology students 
or sending a research assistant down the street to a local school, one would have to learn the 
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languages, habits, preferences and biases of perfect strangers. This is a daunting and 
expensive enterprise to be sure. Unfortunately, good science sometimes requires costly 
efforts. 
Whether or not the experiments reported here represent good science is for the reader 
to judge. We have at least tried to show that the effort is worthwhile, by reporting findings 
that seriously call into question the empirical generality and theoretical importance of 
conclusions based exclusively or primarily on studies of people from our own society and the 
cultural milieu most accessible to us. Of course, we are not the only ones to make the effort. 
Psychologists Susan Carey and Greg Solomon have teamed up with anthropologists Maurice 
Bloch and Rita Astuti in an ambitious cross-cultural research project that promises new 
insights into the subtle but pervasive effects of cultural experience on acquisition of 
biological knowledge. As their results come in, the debate on the origins and development of 
biological knowledge will likely reach a new level of sophistication and perhaps an 
unexpected resolution. Other cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary research efforts are now 
underway. The new Journal of Cognition and Culture comes as a timely carrier and spur for 
us all. 
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Table 1: Means for Yukatek Maya Induction Task 
 
 Young children 
 
(4-5) Older children 
  
(6-7)  Adults  
HUMAN females males avg females males avg females males avg 
human 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 
mammal 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.46 0.57 0.52 0.58 0.71 0.65 
bird 0.63 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.25 0.58 0.42 
reptile 0.75 0.36 0.55 0.38 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.46 0.31 
invertebrate 0.67 0.43 0.55 0.62 0.33 0.47 0.13 0.25 0.19 
tree 0.50 0.36 0.43 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.02 
stuff 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.04 
artifact 0.50 0.29 0.39 0.23 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.04 
sun 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.42 0.38 0.40 0.13 0.08 0.10 
          
DOG females males avg females males avg females males avg 
human 0.64 0.54 0.59 0.83 0.17 0.50 0.25 0.71 0.48 
mammal 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 
bird 0.46 0.68 0.57 0.33 0.58 0.46 0.17 0.42 0.29 
reptile 0.64 0.46 0.55 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.04 0.38 0.21 
invertebrate 0.32 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.19 
tree 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.02 
stuff 0.29 0.14 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 
artifact 0.25 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.06 
sun 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.08 
          
PEC females males avg females males avg females males avg 
human 0.08 0.50 0.29 0.58 0.33 0.46 0.79 0.67 0.73 
mammal 0.50 0.71 0.61 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.81 
bird 0.42 0.36 0.39 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.25 0.54 0.40 
reptile 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.33 0.40 0.17 0.46 0.31 
invertebrate 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.58 0.33 0.46 0.17 0.42 0.29 
tree 0.33 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.21 0.23 
stuff 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.25 0.38 0.31 
artifact 0.42 0.14 0.28 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02 
sun 0.33 0.50 0.42 0.31 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.08 0.10 
          
BEE females males avg females males avg females males avg 
human 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.50 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.75 0.67 
mammal 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.21 0.33 0.27 
bird 0.46 0.29 0.37 0.38 0.52 0.45 0.08 0.29 0.19 
reptile 0.50 0.29 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.29 0.15 
invertebrate 0.92 0.39 0.65 0.85 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.63 0.69 
tree 0.25 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.63 0.50 
stuff 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.05 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.15 
artifact 0.42 0.07 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 
sun 0.58 0.36 0.47 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.13 
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Table 2. Percent birth parent choice for each probe type for each group  
 
  Known   Unknown     
GROUP behavior phys feat mean behavior phys feat mean KIND BLOOD Bias Control 
(Food) 
4-5 year olds 0.74** 0.68* 0.71 0.69** 0.68* 0.69 0.65 0.56 0.06*** 
6-7 year olds 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.97 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.83 0.99*** 0.79** 0.01*** 
adults 1.0*** 0.96*** 0.98 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.92 0.97*** 0.88*** 0*** 
Mean 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.74 0.02 
 
p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001*** 
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Appendix A 
 
 
I. WARM-UP QUESTION 
 
A baby deer grew up with other deer in the forest. When the baby is all grown up will 
it to drink water or coffee? Will it be brown or green? 
 
II. ADOPTION STORY 
 
{Paired Items X / Y:  COW / PIG, PIGEON / TURKEY, TURTLE / TOAD} 
 
I‟m going to tell you a story. One day a X (e.g., cow) gave birth to a little baby. 
Here‟s a drawing of the X (e.g., the cow) that gave birth to the baby [child sees drawing of 
X]. Right after the baby was born the X (e.g., the cow) died without ever seeing the baby 
[drawing of X is removed]. 
 
The baby was found and taken right away to live with Ys (e.g., pigs) in a place where 
there are lots of Ys (e.g., pigs). Here‟s a drawing of the Y (e.g., the pig) [child sees drawing 
of Y] which took care of the baby the whole time that the baby was growing up [drawing of 
Y is removed]. The baby grew up with Ys (e.g., pigs) and never saw another X (e.g., cow) 
again. 
 
Now the baby is all grown up and I‟m going to ask some questions about what it‟s 
like as an adult. 
 
 
III. FOLLOW-UP QUESTION ABOUT THE RELATION OF SPECIES KIND TO INTERNAL 
FUNCTION-STRUCTURE 
 
When the baby was growing up it became sick. A doctor came and, with a needle, took out all 
of the old blood that the baby got from its mother [show drawing of birth parent, X] when it was born. 
The doctor then went to the animal that was taking care of the baby [show drawing of adoptive parent 
Y] and took some of its blood to give to the baby. So the baby got all new blood like the blood of Y. 
 
Now the baby is all grown up, what kind of animal is it? Go ahead and point out the 
kind of animal the baby grew up to be. 
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Appendix B 
 
Known Traits  
   
 TURTLE TOAD 
Phys feature shell on its back warts on its back 
Behavior walks slowly hops 
 PIGEON TURKEY 
Phys feature short neck long neck 
Behavior very used to flying high very used to running on ground 
 COW PIG 
Phys feature straight tail curly tail 
Behavior moo oink 
   
Unknown Traits  
   
 TURTLE / TOAD  
Phys feature stomach gets harder when it sleeps stomach gets softer when it sleeps 
Behavior opens its eyes when afraid closes its eyes when afraid 
 PIGEON / TURKEY  
Phys feature blood becomes thick and sticky when it 
sleeps 
blood becomes thin and watery when it sleeps 
Behavior stops when it sees a mahogany tree  stops when it sees a cedar tree  
 COW / PIG  
Phys feature heart gets flatter when it sleeps heart gets rounder when it sleeps 
Behavior looks for chachalacas  looks for pigeons  
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Figure 7 
 
Examples of Pictures of Mother Animals 
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Figure 8 
 
Examples of Known Traits (straight vs. curly tail) 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
Examples of Unknown Traits (flat vs. round heart) 
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 Carey (1995) acknowledges that biology may depart from psychology even earlier than age 
7, and intimates that biology and psychology may initially constitute a single undifferentiated 
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domain of causal understanding. The implications of this view are not clear. No new 
predictions follow about the causal structure and ontological composition of either domain 
that are not present in Carey‟s (1985) earlier account (except for the ad hoc prediction that 
the two domains diverge at an earlier age). 
3
 More extended versions of the independence of biological causality apply to humans as well 
as nonhumans (Hirschfeld 1994, 1996; Springer 1992, 1996; cf. Weissman & Kalish 1999). 
In these versions, children also differentiate human biology from human psychology early on. 
It is not at all apparent, however, that the putative biological structures of individual humans, 
kin groups, and nonkin social groups (e.g., races) are cognitively processed in the same way 
as the biological organization of nonhuman species and their members. For example, 
nonhuman individuals appear to be universally and “automatically” processed as exemplars 
of the unique species they instantiate. By contrast, individual humans are not primarily or 
invariably processed as biological exemplars of one and only one group, much less as 
exemplars of taxonomic equivalence classes that fully and uniquely partition the human 
domain (Atran 1998). In any event, the experiments reported in this article do not necessarily 
rule out, or generalize to, nontaxonomic and extended versions of folkbiology that apply also 
to humans. 
4
 For those organisms that are phenomenally salient for human beings, such as most 
vertebrates and flowering plants, there is usually only one representative species of a 
biological genus in any given locale.  Because biological genus and species are often 
extensionally equivalent in a locality, there is no conceptual basis for a consistent 
folkbiological distinction between them. Such a distinction emerged only during Europe‟s 
Age of Exploration, when foreign species were integrated into the taxonomic system by 
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attaching them to a European type-species at the genus level (Atran 1990). 
5
 Such universal aspects of folkbiology may represent evolutionary constraints on any and all 
theorizing in biology, including evolutionary theory itself (Atran 1998). If the end state of 
acquired knowledge is everywhere structurally similar in design, and functionally critical to 
dealings with multiple environments, then it is plausibly an evolutionary adaptation to 
relevant and recurrent aspects of ancestral hominid conditions – such as the need of far-
ranging hunters and foragers to recognize, avoid and exploit indefinitely many ambient 
species. 
6
  This methodology applied to a sample of urban Boston children replicated Carey‟s findings 
in important respects. Carey found significant differences between strength of projections 
from humans to categories in the same class (e.g., aardvark, dog) as the base (e.g., dog), and 
the strength of projection from the non-human base (dog) to humans for 4-year-olds (e.g., 
average difference Human > mammal  minus  Mammal > human =  50%) and 6-year-olds 
(20%).  Coley et al. also find an asymmetry for Boston 4-year-olds (26%) and 6-year-olds 
(39%). 
7
  In another study, however, Gelman and Wellman (1991) asked children to reason about 
plants without identifying the species membership. For example, they described a seed that 
came from an apple and was planted in a field a corn, without identifying the seed as “an 
apple seed.” The results were largely the same as with the animals (cf. Hickling & Gelman 
1995). 
8
 Earlier work by Solomon et al. (1996) that established the property-differentiation paradigm 
was criticized by Springer (1996) as having an overly complex methodology. When Springer 
reduced the task demands in the switched-at-birth design by simplifying the adoption story, a 
  
 47 
 
 
 
  
fairly robust nativist position emerged. In a task where the story was modified to exclude 
explicit reference to adoption, preschoolers showed a greater tendency to attribute physical 
properties to birth parents than non-physical properties (e.g., beliefs); however, there was no 
overall birth bias even for physical properties (see also Hirschfeld 1994). The relevance of 
these studies for our experiments are not clear inasmuch as all the stories used were heavily 
anthropomorphic and involved many implicit but critically unexamined assumptions about 
animals having preferences, beliefs, propositional attitudes and so on. In any event, Johnson 
and Solomon‟s (1997) study avoids some of the earlier problems noted by Springer. For 
example, their story does not mention “adoption” and is structured in ways quite similar to 
Springer‟s modified story. 
9
 This inheritance study was performed with three different groups of 4-5 year-olds in Brazil. 
Preliminary analysis shows a pattern of results very similar to Yukatek Maya 4-5 year-olds. 
10
 This example illustrates another problem with Carey‟s idea of an implicit theory or 
explanatory framework. The claim that the knowledge that germs causes diseases is only a 
knowledge of input-output relations blurs the distinction between theory and tabulation of 
observable regularities that is fundamental to Carey‟s approach. Germs are not observable 
entities in this context and ought to be classified as theoretical entities. Granted there is no 
clear or neat distinction between observable entities and non-observable entities, or between 
empirical laws and theories; however, without this distinction in principle, the notion of 
intuitive theory becomes incoherent.  
11
  Carey‟s linguistic essentialism conforms to certain aspects of Streven‟s (2000) account of 
“minimalist” essentialism. Psychological essentialism and minimalist essentialism both allow 
that children may have little, if any, idea of specific causal mechanisms. According to 
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Strevens (2000:163): "This is not to say that children think that there are no essences; rather, 
they have no opinion about what it is that makes the causal laws true.” This suggestion 
resemble‟s Medin and Ortony‟s (1989) idea of an “ essence placeholder”; however, there is a 
difference. On Strevens‟ minimalist account, no concept of “common-cause” is needed to 
explain children‟s performance. Strevens‟ essentialism is even more liberal than Carey‟s in 
that mass terms, such as “mud” and “red things,” may be just as good candidates for 
essentialism as count terms. Thus, red things share the disjunctive “essence” of whatever 
causes them to be red: red stars are red because of the way light filters through the earth‟s 
atmosphere to our retinas; British telephone booths are red because they are painted red; male 
sticklebacks are red in part because of their DNA, and so on. Muddy things share the 
conjunctive “essence of being soft, wet, slimy, sticky earth, although several different and 
independent causes may be involved. All that is needed is the presumption that something 
causes surface features. That something may have divided reference: one thing can cause a 
lion to roar and another thing, unrelated to the first, can cause a lion to have a mane. 
Furthermore, any given surface feature might have more than one cause: two or more 
different things might cause a lion to roar. Finally, some causes might be deep and others 
superficial, such as believing a male lion‟s mane is genetically caused versus believing that it 
produced by fright, grooming by female lions or other external agents. Neither Carey nor 
Strevens provide clear descriptions of what they mean by an essence, except to allow 
essences to comprehend concepts that do not depend upon deep or common-cause. For a 
modal account of biological essentialism, see Atran 1987. 
12
 Gelman and Hirschfeld (1999) propose a classification of types of essentialism, 
specifically distinguishing between sortal essentialism (the “classical” view of concepts as 
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defined by necessary and sufficient conditions) and causal essentialism (the unknown and 
perhaps unknowable principles that are physically responsible for something being what it 
is). This distinction does not capture the nuances between the various types of causal 
relationships pertinent to our discussion of the differences between Carey, Strevens, and 
Medin and Ortony. REFERENCES 
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